We study how monitoring, expert skill and consumer awareness a §ect the level of misconduct in markets with asymmetric information and price-taking experts. Theoretical predictions show that experts subject to more intense monitoring may be less ethical in equilibrium. Similarly, more experienced experts are predicted to exhibit greater levels of misconduct. We test these predictions in the insurance sales industry and Önd that monitored experts are 21 to 98% more likely to take advantage of customers, relative to unmonitored experts. We also Önd empirical evidence that more experienced experts are signiÖcantly more likely to mislead their customers.
ì... will people push the envelope and pitch lucrative and complicated products to clients even if they are not the simplest investments or the ones most directly aligned with the clientís goals? Absolutely. Every day, in fact.î -Greg Smith, former executive at Goldman Sachs New York Times Op-Ed (March 14, 2012) Expert services Örms are often found in markets with substantial asymmetric information problemsóproviders of technical advice are common in the automotive, medical, engineering, and Önancial services industries. Experts beneÖt from customers trusting and buying their advice; however, experts may also face incentives that lead them to provide less than perfect recommendations. For example, a mechanic can provide a more extensive Öx than warranted and a dentist can replace a Ölling that has not failed. In addition to over-treating a problem, experts can also suggest the wrong solution. For example, investment or insurance advisors can recommend products that o §er customers less beneÖt, but provide themselves with greater revenue than the customersí ideal products.
With credence goods, it is di¢cult for a customer to determine whether the product or service is the best match for his or her needs. In extreme cases, the customer may never discover if the product was the most appropriate oneófor example, the Önal beneÖt of life insurance is realized upon death. 1 When it is di¢cult for a customer to discern the correct product or service, an expert who both advises and receives revenue based on his advice faces conáicting incentives. High quality advice may improves the customerís payo §; yet, when taken by the customer, inappropriate advice may lead to higher expert revenue. Many of the existing models of expert services allow advisors to adjust both quality and prices. In contrast, we explore credence good markets with price-taking experts. Examples of price-taking experts include individual physicians and dentists who may have limited scope to adjust prices for a particular patient; taxi cab drivers who face regulated rates; and, our empirical setting, insurance sales agents who face Öxed commissions and prices.
In this paper, we ask: How do monitoring, experience and skill a §ect expertsí propensity to engage in professional misconduct? We focus on monitoring because it is a salient point of di §erentiation in many expert services marketsóexperts may work as independent advisors and be subject to little oversight; or experts may work as representatives of large, hierarchical organizations. While monitoring may appear beneÖcial for customers who rely on expertsí advice, just the opposite happens in our setting: Experts at Örms with hierarchies and structure for monitoring are the ones most likely to take advantage of customers.
The intuition is as follows: Since experts are price takers, their dimension of competition is their level of misconduct. For a given level of malfeasance, customers working with experts in Örms with monitoring fare better in expectation relative to customers using unmonitored experts. Monitored experts cannot set their own prices to extract surplus from the larger expected consumer beneÖts of greater monitoring; instead, they extract surplus through greater misconduct. Similarly, more experienced experts are more skillful at providing the most appropriate solution for customersí needs. Hence, they can extract more rents through increased misconduct compared to less experienced experts.
We test the predictions of our theoretical model using data from insurance markets. Here, we have a clear credence good setting, particularly in life insurance and annuity sales. Additionally, experts themselves acknowledge the ethical quandary of their Öeld. In Cooper and Frank (2005) , a survey of insurance agents Önds that agents consistently identify three primary ethical issues: failure to identify the customerís needs and recommend products that meet those needs; false or misleading representation of products or services; and conáicts between customer beneÖts and opportunities for personal Önancial gain.
For our empirical tests, we construct a rich dataset describing individual insurance agents operating in Texas. We match licensing data with company a¢liations and detailed sales practice complaint records from the state regulator. From the company a¢liation data, we identify two types of experts: monitored agents from large, branded companies, and unmonitored agents working as independents. We Önd that the odds of monitored experts from large, branded companies taking advantage of their customers are 21 to 98% greater than the odds for unmonitored independent experts. In a supplemental analysis, we use national sale practice complaints data to conÖrm our results. Finally, we Önd that more experienced agents are signiÖcantly more likely to mislead their customers.
Reputation has been o §ered as a solution to asymmetric information problems in markets. Reputation is built through repeated interactions across or within customers over time (for examples, see Kreps (1990) and Tadelis (1999) ). However, the nature of credence good markets means that misconduct is seldom observed; the signals required for reputation building are not su¢ciently informative (Mailath and Samuelson 2001) . As a result, it is often not possible to build a reputation of good behavior. Yet, we still observe strong branding of Örms in many credence good settingsófor example, insurance companies, wirehouses, and hospital networks are often heavily advertised. Branding and reputation solve informational asymmetry in many markets; however, in our empirical setting, the correlation between strong branding and monitoring leads to a prediction that experts from large, branded Örms are actually more likely to engage in misconduct. Darby and Karni (1973) provide the foundation for the literature on credence goods. Pitchik and Schotter (1987) Emons (1997) shows that market equilibria with honest expert behavior exist when customers can infer sellersí incentives for fraud from market data. Customer heterogeneity may also drive the credence good problem. Fong (2005) shows that cheating arises when Örms target high-valuation and high-cost customers. Feddersen and Gilligan (2001) Önd that third parties, namely activists, can ameliorate the credence good problem. Taylor (1995) examines multi-period contracts and warranties as another solution. Inderst and Ottaviani (2009 , 2011 ) study Örms trying to induce agents to provide advice to imperfectly informed customers. They Önd that mis-selling depends on Örm asymmetries, customer awareness, and agentsí utility from giving suitable recommendations. Broadly, in their models, agents provide honest advice when Örms are symmetric or there are su¢ciently many aware customers in the market. Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) present a model that uniÖes the extant literature and rationalizes many of the previous theoretical Öndings. Hubbard (1998) explores empirically the incentives faced by experts in automotive repair services. He Önds that private Örms are more likely than state inspectors to help vehicles pass emissions tests. Moreover, he Önds that independent experts are more likely to provide favorable inspection reports, relative to branded ìchainî shops with non-owner managers. Hubbard (2002) suggests that the possibility of many future transactions provides incentives for experts to o §er more favorable advice, particularly where experts are residual claimants. Free-riding may also dampen individual expertsí incentives, as Örms with more inspectors tend to help vehicles pass less frequently. Levitt and Syverson (2008) Önd that real estate agents invest more e §ort and secure a higher price for the sale of their own property, relative to their customersí homes. Similar to the mechanism proposed by Hubbard (2002) , Levitt and Syverson argue that the absence of frequent and repeated interactions limits customersí abilities to verify their agentsí service quality. They also Önd that the di §erence between agent-owned and non-agent-owned sale prices is increasing in the degree of asymmetric information about property values. In a very di §erent context, Gruber and Owings (1996) Önd that physicians perform more cesarean-section deliveries in response to negative income shocks. Mullainathan, Noeth, and Schoar (2012) conduct a Öeld audit study in a U.S. market and Önd that Önancial advisors often recommend self-serving products. Anagol, Cole, and Sarkar (2012) conduct an audit study of insurance sales agents in India and Önd similar results.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present our theory model and results. Section 2 provides institutional background on the insurance industry. Our data are described in Section 3 and our empirical results are presented in Section 4. Our Önal section discusses the implications of our Öndings.
A Model of Credence Goods Sales
In this paper, we present a model inspired by the unifying model in Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) , hereafter DK. However, our model di §ers in important ways.
In DK, di §erent outcomes are driven by experts o §ering services at di §erent prices (e.g. mechanics choose quality and prices for auto repairs). In fact, virtually all of the aforementioned theory papers studied price-setting Örms or advisors. In contrast, we consider a market in which experts are price takers. In our empirical setting, insurance agents are constrained to o §er products with Öxed premiums and commissions. 2 Industries with regulated prices also exhibit this feature. We assume that a customer is made worse o § by an inappropriate match, regardless of his or her level of need. Existing models have assumed that experts have only limited opportunities for misconductófor example, experts can provide a major repair for a minor problem, but can only provide a major repair for a major problem. These models have assumed away an expertís áexibility to take advantage of customers that have major needs (see DK and cites therein). However, in practice, experts may provide inappropriate treatment to a variety of customer types. For example, a doctor can order excessive tests for any level of medical need. Similarly, an insurance agent can always oversell life insurance coverage to generate greater commission.
Rather than assuming that all experts work in a common institutional setting, we allow for two types of experts: monitored and unmonitored. This extension allows us to explore how di §erent organizational structures support di §erent levels of misconduct.
We assume there is always some chance of mistreatment being discovered, resulting in a penalty against the expert. In general, previous work has assumed that customers can only identify and punish experts for an under-provision of servicesóonly a minor treatment given for a major problem can be discovered ex-post by the customer.
Finally, we extend the credence good model to allow for heterogeneous expert skill and the introduction of connoisseur consumers. 3 
Basic Model
Consider an interaction between an expert and a customer that can result in two outcomes: the expert can recommend either an appropriate or inappropriate product. For convenience, we will use the index ìRî and ìW î as mnemonics for the ìrightî (appropriate) and ìwrongî (inappropriate) products, respectively. We assume that the expert knows which product is appropriate for the customer, but the customer does not. After the expert makes his product recommendation, the customer must chose to buy or not to buy.
Suppose that  R and  W are the payo §s to an expert for selling the appropriate and inappropriate products, respectively. It follows that  t is a reduced form representation of the net payo § (i.e., gross revenue minus business expenses) of selling product t 2 fR; W g; before any possible penalty for mis-selling to a customer (i.e., recommending W ).
As depicted below, the timeline for the expert-customer interaction is sequential.
Since the customer cannot condition his purchase decision on any information about the quality of the expertís recommendation, the game can be solved simultaneously.
Let s be the probability that the expert recommends product W and (1  s) be the probability that he recommends R: Now, assume that there is some expected cost k (s) > 0 for recommending W; where k(0) = k 0 (0) = 0 and @ @s k (s) > 0: Thus, k (s) reáects the expected cost of mistreating customers which, in turn, reáects both the probability of detection and the magnitude of the punishment. Psychological costs associated with ìdoing the wrong thingî may also enter into k (s).
In our model, if an expert o §ers the inappropriate product and the customer does not buy it, then the expert still faces a payo § of k(s): This captures the notion that experts who attempt to deceive their customers will face some probability of detection regardless of whether the customers actually buy the (inappropriate) products. For example, in the insurance industry, a customer typically receives a 10-to 30-day ìfree lookî after paying for an annuity or life insurance product. During this period, a customer could discover that he was sold W , report the agent to the regulator, and cancel the policy. This feature of our model relaxes the typical credence good model assumption that customers remain forever ignorant of their expertís misconduct. 4 Let b be the probability that the customer buys the expertís recommended product and (1  b) be the probability that the customer rejects the expertís recommendation. Suppose that the customer earns a net payo § of V R from buying R and V W from buying W , where
If the customer decides not to buy any product, then her payo § is 0, her normalized outside option. Note that we assume that a customer is worse o § buying the wrong product than he would have been simply not buying at all. Absent this assumption, the customer would rather be mistreated with certainty than reject the expertís advice, even knowing such advice is bad.
The payo §s can be described in a 2 x 2 matrix, where the Örst coordinate is the expertís payo § and the second is the customerís payo §:
In the following section, we identify the mixed strategy equilibrium in which the customer is indi §erent between buying and not buying. Following Harsanyi (1973) , these mixed strategies can be reframed as representing a heterogeneous population of customers, each with a pure strategy. Since k(s) is endogenous, the expert will choose a pure strategy.
Monitoring
We enrich the model to consider experts from Örms with di §erent levels of monitoring. We assume that the experts face similar payo §s across di §erent levels of monitoring and, for a given level of misconduct, customersí payo §s are also equal. 5 This formulation of the model captures a common feature of expert industries: some experts operate in larger, branded Örms with monitoring, while other experts operate as small, independent advisors with little (if any) monitoring. For example, in Önancial services, several monitored experts typically work in a branch o¢ce that is overseen by a manager. Independent experts may work in one-agent o¢ces without supervision.
Assume that a monitor observes expertsí recommendations with probability q 2 [0; 1] ; where q = 0 represents no oversight and q = 1 means that every expert recommendation is reviewed. If the monitor observes an expert recommending W; then he stops the transactionóthe consumer is indemniÖed for her loss V W (i.e. she receives her outside option 0), and the expert faces penalty k (s) and does not keep any positive payo §  W . 6 If the monitor observes an expert recommending R; then he does not intervene. Therefore, the expertís payo § for suggesting R is b R ; but his payo § for recommending W is
Since monitoring changes customersí payo §s, the level of misconduct s will also change. In particular, though the customerís payo § from the appropriate product is still V R ; she now receives (1q)V W when she purchases the inappropriate product, where
Monitoring saves her from some of the bad recommendations. At low levels of monitoring, it cannot be an equilibrium for the customer to always buy; if this were so, the expert would always suggest W: But then the customer would be better o § never purchasing. Never purchasing cannot be an equilibrium because then the expert will only suggest R and the customer would then choose to always buy. Hence, the customerís strategy must be a mixed one, at least for low levels of monitoring. Solving for the rate of s such that the customer is indi §erent between buying and not buying yields
Note that s  is increasing in the level of monitoring (
facing a monitored expert knows that there is some chance that the expert will o §er the wrong product; however, there is also some probability that the monitor will detect this misconduct and refund the customerís payment. Overall, holding expert misconduct Öxed, the customer has a higher expected payo § from a transaction with a more monitored expert. In equilibrium,the expert must not want to deviate from her required course of action s  :
Thus, she solves the following problem, taking b as given:
The Örst order condition yields
Note that we already know the s  that sustains an equilibrium. Hence, we can solve the Örst order condition in terms of b  ; such that the expert strictly prefers to provide s  for a given level of monitoring. Note that k() is convex; the second order condition conÖrms that a maximum is obtained. Thus, we Önd
Increased monitoring results in a greater buy rate b  : Hence, experts with greater misconduct enjoy greater buy rates from customers; these experts extract more surplus from the value created by greater monitoring. We assume that
This assumption on the primitives ensures that customers do not always buy from the expert in the absence of monitoringóthis would assume away the credence good problem.
After some level of monitoring q 2 (0; 1), the expected cost of recommending W is so great that the expert only recommends R: This occurs when
At some q < q with k(s) > 0; the buy rate will already equal 1; in particular, this occurs when
This means that the level of monitoring q where the customer always buys is
It is straightforward to show that, although k() is indirectly a function of q; there is a unique value of q that solves (2):
Thus, when q 2 [q; q]; the customer always buys. For this region of monitoring, the expert now faces the problem
and the expert chooses s according to the expression
The left-and right-hand side of expression (3) represent the marginal beneÖt and marginal cost of misconduct, respectively. In contrast to all lower values of monitoring, the level of misconduct is now decreasing in the level of monitoring. For high levels of monitoring or detection (i.e., when q > q), we Önd that increased monitoring reduces misconduct.
To illustrate these two regions of monitoring intensity, consider a simple example with
In the Ögure, misconduct increases in monitoring until customers always buy. With higher levels of monitoring, customers still always buy, but misconduct is weakly decreasing. Expertsí revenues track their misconductórevenues increase with low levels of monitoring and decline at higher levels.
We summarize our Öndings in the following proposition.
With lower monitoring intensity, when q < q; increasing the rate of monitoring q increases the level of misconduct s  ; expert revenue, and customer buy rate b  : With higher monitoring intensity, when q  q; increasing the rate of monitoring q weakly decreases the level of misconduct s  and revenue, and customers always buy.
One might wonder why all Örms do not monitor their experts at high levels. First, intense monitoring may be too costly. Second, it may not be possible for the Örm to monitor all activities, particularly when experts have the ability to hide some of their actions.
While the e §ect of monitoring depends on the particular empirical context, monitoring is far from perfect in credence good markets and, in practice, most likely in the lower region q < q. More formally, consider an e §ective level of monitoring q  e q Pr(detectedje q), where e q is the frequency an expertís advice is reviewed by a monitor and Pr(detectedje q) is the likelihood of detecting misconduct given a review. Even with e q = 1; since Pr(detectedje q) is expected to be small for credence good markets, q is low.
Monitoring is similar in spirit to whistle-blowing. The critical di §erence is that, with whistle-blowing, we assume that the customer does not have an improved payo § in the event of misconduct and detection. That is, whistle-blowing involves the detection of bad behavior, but not the indemniÖcation of abused customers. Since customersí payo §s are una §ected by whistle-blowing, experts do not increase their level of unethical sales behavior.
Note that we could also simply have written the downside customer payo § of V W (and the upside expert payo § of  W ) as some general increasing (decreasing) function of the degree of monitoring q: In this case, the comparative statics of s  and b  for q < q still follow immediately. However, we would now need to put structure on V W (q) and  W (q) to ensure the existence of some level of monitoring that restores the market.
Connoisseur Consumers
In this section, we consider the impact of connoisseur consumers on the market equilibrium. Connoisseurs are deÖned as consumers who are perfectly informed about the appropriateness of the recommended product and, therefore, only and always buy from an expert who recommends R. We assume that experts cannot distinguish a connoisseur from a regular customeróotherwise, the expert simply always suggests R to such consumers and regular consumers are una §ected. Adding connoisseurs is equivalent to introducing some probability that a consumer knows the appropriate product for herself. With a mass  of connoisseurs in the market, the expertís payo § for suggesting R increases while her payo § for suggesting W decreases. The expertís problem is now
Therefore, the overall market buy rate is
This expression suggests that as monitoring increases, the market will reach a buy rate of 1 sooner than in a market without connoisseurs. Of course, holding q Öxed, increasing the measure of connoisseurs also eventually leads to a buy rate of 1. As in a market without connoisseurs, once monitoring is su¢ciently high, non-connoisseur customers always buy and the expert decreases her misconduct until s = 0:
We summarize these Öndings in our second proposition.
Proposition 2 As the mass of connoisseurs  increases, the equilibrium buy rate of nonconnoisseur consumers b  ! 1: Expert misconduct is weakly decreasing in :
This extension links pure experience and credence good models: when  = 1; customers can perfectly assess product quality after purchase and return a low quality product to the seller; when  = 0; the customer never learns the true product quality.
Observable Di §erences in Expert Skill
We also consider a version of the model where, on occasion, experts inadvertently recommend the inappropriate product. Thus, we assume that an expert makes harmful mistakes. 7 Of course, the expert is also able to choose to recommend the inappropriate product, since that may increase his revenue at the customerís expense. In this extension, we consider the e §ect of expertsí skill di §erences, conditional on a given level of monitoring. Let h be the commonly known probability that an expert makes an error. Now an expert faces the problem
with the following Örst order condition:
Thus, s  will be smaller than when h = 0; since the marginal cost increased. In addition, s  will di §er by skill level because buy rates are a function of expert skill. A customer must be indi §erent between buying from an expert with an error rate of h and earning her outside option of 0:
This suggests that the less skilled an expert, the less likely he is to engage in misconduct. All else equal, if an expertís experience or training is negatively correlated with the likelihood of making a mistake, then more experienced experts should have a greater rate of misconduct.
We summarize these Öndings below.
Proposition 3 More error-prone experts are less likely to engage in misconduct.
Corollary 4 If the error rate h is negatively correlated with experience, more experienced experts engage in more misconduct.
In summary, the model yields four main results:
1. Under low levels of e §ective monitoring, more heavily monitored experts are more likely to take advantage of customers.
2. The probability of misconduct is increasing in an expertís level of experience.
3. When the population of expert customers is su¢ciently large, expert misconduct declines. Below this threshold, increases in the number of expert customers leaves the level of expert misconduct unchanged.
4. Customers are more likely to buy from more monitored experts.
2 The Insurance Industry
Insurance as Credence Goods
Insurance sales is a classic credence good market with price-taking experts. Products are complicated and multidimensional, and it is very di¢cult for even sophisticated consumers to identify the appropriate product for their needs. This is particularly true for life insurance and annuity products (LA) where insurers impose multiple ìridersî and introduce modiÖ-cations to policies that may be opaque to customers. 8 Consequently, a customer may be 8 For example, life insurance policies can be term, universal, whole, variable and variable universal. In addition, a myriad of ìridersî exist, including terminal illness and disability waivers, long-term care provisions, and accidental death beneÖts.
The National Association of Insurance Commissions publishes a buyersí guide that describes some of the product complexities (http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer_guide_life.pdf).
sold an inappropriate product, but may never become aware of the sellerís misconduct or mistake. With life insurance, the customer will never experience how well the policy serves his expected needs. Moreover, the insured customer and his beneÖciaries may never learn whether there existed a superior product in the market at the time of purchase. Property and casualty insurance (PC) policies (e.g., auto or homeowners insurance) tend to be more understandableóthe payouts and the conditions for payouts are often more transparent than other insurance products.
Insurance agents cannot adjust the prices faced by individual customersóindeed, this practice called ìrebatingî is illegal in most jurisdictions. 9 An insurance agent can enhance his commissions by recommending the wrong product to a customer. This increased revenue can come from simply ìoversellingî the level of insurance or from selling a product with a higher commission rate (i.e., percent of the customerís premium paid to the agent).
Commissions vary signiÖcantly across and within product types. For example, commissions from annuities typically range between 2 and 10% of the invested amount. 10 Typically, commission amounts are not disclosed to customers, allowing an agent to recommend an inferior product for a larger commission. In general, the tradeo § between the beneÖts to the policyholder and the revenue for the seller is substantialófor example, a so-called ìbonusî annuity pays the customer an additional interest rate in the Örst year; however, the bonus rate and the commission rate are negatively correlated.
Monitoring and Organizational Forms
Insurance agents work primarily under two di §erent organizational structures: agents work for large, branded companies that monitor their agents or as independent experts with little oversight. Monitored company agents are typically a¢liated with a single insurance company and may market only approved products from that company. 11 In practice, these product lists are quite large and there is little concern that company agents are too constrained. Companies using this organizational form may o §er employment beneÖts packages and provide introductory training to inexperienced agents. New agents may also receive guaranteed salaries that phase out as they build up ìbooksî of business, typically over 12 to 24 months. Company agents also have access to o¢ce space and administrative sta §. Hierarchy within the Örms ensures some level of monitoringófor example, branch managers may oversee and 9 Rebating is illegal in our data environment (Texas Insurance Code CHAPTER 1806, Section 53). 10 Our commission rate estimates and discussion of monitoring are based on personal communication with professional insurance agents. 11 These agents may also be authorized to market selected products from other companies through agreements between their primary company and other Örms. approve large or complicated transactions. Company agents may earn 50 to 70% of the gross commissions of their sales, depending on the type of insurance product. State Farm, Farmers Insurance, Allstate, Northwestern Mutual and New York Life are examples of Örms using the company agent model (A.M. Best 2011); in general, these Örms have well-known, easily-recognized brand names. 12 We include a list of insurance companies using company agents in the Appendix. In contrast, independent agents are not a¢liated with a single insurance company. Typically, independent agents are responsible for all of their expenses; however, they generally earn 100% of the gross commissions on their sales. While independent agents are not restricted to selling insurance from any particular company, they usually cannot market products from insurance companies that use company agentsófor example, an independent agent cannot market any State Farm products. Independent agents are often ìone agent shopsî and their transactions are not overseen by managers or supervisors. After accounting for business expenses, both company and independent agents earn roughly the same net commissions (Carson et al. 2007 ).
Data
Our Texas insurance agent dataset was compiled from multiple public sources and consists of licensing, appointment, complaint, and market share information. Broadly, the data cover the population of agents operating in the state and characterize both Örm a¢liations and reported incidents of misconduct in Texasís insurance industry.
Agents and Organizational Form
The licensing data were acquired from the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) and cover all agents who were licensed to sell insurance in the state of Texas as of 2010. Overall, the data describe 235,604 agents: 60,812 agents are licensed to sell PC insurance only; 135,441 agents are licensed to sell LA only; and 39,351 agents hold licenses for both PC and LA. The licensing data include unique agent identiÖers and the date on which each agent was Örst licensed in the state.
To identify the organizational form under which individual agents operate, we match company and appointments data from two sources. Company-level data were acquired from 12 A.M. Best (2011) and allow us to identify companies by marketing typeñthese data distinguish Örms that use monitored company agents from ones that sell through unmonitored independent agents. We then obtained appointments data from the TDI for Örms employing a company agent model. Appointments data list all agents designated to sell a Örmís products. Using agentsí license numbers, we match license holders to Örms and, thus, characterize individual agentsí a¢liations. Through this process, we identify 59,511 individuals who work as company agents (25.3% of licensees in the state).
We also acquired marketshare data from the TDI, describing the in-state total premiums written for all Örms operating in Texas.
Complaints
The TDI maintains a public directory of complaints against insurance companies, agents and agencies. We accessed data describing 501,553 unique complaints Öled between 1996 and 2010. The directory reports the date and nature of the complaint, the line of coverage (PC or LA), the license number of the subjects of the complaint, and whether the complaint was deemed ìjustiÖedî or ìunjustiÖedî by the TDI. 13 Complaints vary considerably, from claims disputes to accusations about unfair cancellations. Many complaints, even those leveled at agents, relate to actions under the control of insurance companies (e.g., denial of claims and premium-related complaints). To focus on misconduct at the agent level, we narrow our analysis to a subset of complaints relating to individual agentsí sales practices. We also consider only complaints about PC and LA sales. 14 Table 1 summarizes these agent-level complaints by line of coverage and whether the complaints were justiÖed or not. 15 In total, we identify 23,088 accusations of sales misconduct leveled against 13,356 individuals. Approximately 56% of these complaints were found to be justiÖed. We match the complaints data to the population of agents licensed as of 2010 and Önd that 8,240 of these agents were the subject of at least one complaint. Table 2 presents summary statistics for complaints, reported separately for company and independent agents. Complaints against insurance agents are rare events. Incident rates for both justiÖed and unjustiÖed complaints in PC sales are approximately three times higher than rates for LA, consistent with the notion that LA products have more pronounced 13 In the Appendix, we discuss the role of potential reporting bias due to di §erences in perceived payo §s across expert types. Given that reporting costs are low in practice, we do not expect any substantial bias in our estimates. 14 We exclude complaints relating to medicare supplements and employment insurance sales. 15 The TDI dataset indicates that 122 agent-level marketing complaints were referred to other agencies for investigation; the broad descriptions of these individual complaints include ìAgent mishandling,î ìExcessive physical force,î and ìMisrepresentation.î Because we do not know the outcomes of these investigations, we drop these complaints from the analysis. credence good attributes. Note also that, as our theory suggests, complaint rates appear substantially lower for independent agents relative to company agents. Of course, these summary statistics do not reáect other di §erences, including agent experience and market share across organizational formsówe account for these factors in our next section of results. Table 3 reports aggregate premium and marketshare statistics for Texas by organizational form. While Örms using company agents hold the majority of the marketshare in PC, the opposite is true for LA. 16 Even accounting for the number of agents under each structure, the data suggest that Örms using company agents account for more PC sales.
Results
The credence good model that we analyzed in Section 1 yields four main predictions. In the following section, we present empirical evidence for each prediction. In the Örst two sub-sections, we present strong evidence about the di §erence in misconduct rates between company and independent agents and show that misconduct increases with agent experience. In the Önal two sub-sections, we consider predictions about connoisseur consumers and discuss di §erences in buy-rates across agent types.
Prediction 1: Monitoring and misconduct
Proposition 1 predicts that, at lower levels of e §ective monitoring, monitored agents are more likely to take advantage of customers, relative to unmonitored agents. First, we ask: All else equal, are monitored company agents more likely to have been the subject of a complaint (justiÖed or unjustiÖed), relative to unmonitored independent agents? 17 As suggested by Table 2 , complaints against insurance agents occur very infrequently in the dataóin Texas, fewer than 4% of agents have been the subject of a complaint and less than half of those complaints were considered justiÖed by investigators. Since typical econometric techniques, including logistic regressions, may underestimate the probability of rare events (King and Zeng 2001a), we estimate a logit model with a correction for rare events bias. 16 In their seminal work on property rights theory, Grossman and Hart (1986) apply their model to the insurance industry. They predict that company Örms will hold the majority of marketshare in LA and the minority of marketshare in PC. Their predictions align with the insurance industry structure in the early 1980só65% independent Örms in PC and 12% independent Örms in LA. These marketshares are the opposite of what we Önd in Texas using more recent data. 17 This question captures most misconductóconditional on receiving any PC complaint, only 29% of agents receive additional PC complaints; similarly, only 16% of LA agents receive multiple complaints. King and Zeng (2001a) describe the intuition of the correction: while the large number of zeros in the data allow the density (XjY = 0) to be estimated well, the scarcity of observations for the rare event means that (XjY = 1) is estimated relatively poorly with tails that are systematically too short. That is, the max (XjY = 0) can be estimated well, but the min (XjY = 1) will always be above the true minimum. We estimate the following equation:
where Complaint i equals 1 when agent i has been the subject of at least one TDI complaint and where
where CompanyAgent i equals 1 when agent i is a monitored company agent and matrix X i contains the agent-speciÖc controls described below. Coe¢cient and variance estimates are then corrected using the method of King and Zeng (2001a) . Although the main thrust of our analysis is concerned with di §erences between monitored and unmonitored agents (coe¢cient ); our predictions also speak to the role of agent experience. Recall that PC and LA products vary in terms of the ease with which customers can understand the match between their needs and the policy. To capture potential di §erences across product with di §ering credence good qualities, we distinguish between agents and complaints for PC and LA. We include the following controls in X i ; summarized in Table 4 :
Years since Örst licensed: As a proxy for agent experience, we calculate the years since an agent was Örst licensed to sell insurance in Texas. If agents were licensed in other states prior to licensing by the TDI, we will underestimate their professional experience; if agents allowed their licenses to lapse in some interim periods, we will overestimate their experience. 18 Out-of-state agent: All agents who market insurance to consumers in Texas must be licensed by the TDI. We use the address on agentsí licenses to determine residency and include a dummy variable to indicate when an agent resides outside of Texas.
Professional designation: Insurance agents may seek certiÖcation from several professional organizations. In general, these organizations require members to complete course work and exams, and participate in continuing education. We matched agents to member lists for 11 designations. 19 In our empirical analysis, we include a dummy variable indicating whether the agent holds any professional designation. While only a small percentage of agents hold these credentials, more LA agents have completed certiÖcation programs relative to PC agents.
License type: We include a dummy variable to indicate whether an agent is licensed to sell only one type of insurance (i.e. PC or LA). Most agents are licensed to sell only one type of insurance and slightly more sell LA only. Table 5 reports estimation results from equation (4) with the rare events correction. In both PC and LA regressions, company agents are more likely to have received a complaint, justiÖed or not. We transform our estimated coe¢cients into odds ratio form in Table 5 . Results suggest that the odds of a company agent receiving any PC complaint is 39% higher than the odds of an independent agent receiving a complaint. 20 Examining LA, the odds of a monitored company agent receiving any complaint is 98% higher than for an unmonitored independent agent. PC and LA company agents are substantially more likely to be the subject of a justiÖed complaint, relative to their independent peers. One might ask: Do Örms using company agents systematically hire less honest agents? This seems unlikely given that company agent Örms have established screening processes (e.g. applications, background checks, and interviews). In contrast, independent agents establish their own practices and are not subject to this initial screening. Moreover, dishonest company agents who are Öred are unlikely to gain employment at another company agent Örm, but can readily move into independent sales. Thus, the pool of independent agents may include former company agents who were terminated due to misconduct.
Results also suggest that the di §erence in misconduct across organizational forms is a §ected by the extent of productsí credence good qualities. Namely, when comparing monitored and unmonitored agents, LA productsówhich require more trust from the consumeró are associated with even more misconduct.
One might be concerned that customers of branded companies are more likely to Öle a complaint due to the perceived ìdeep pocketsî of these large Örms. We explore this possibility in the Appendix and conclude that this is cannot fully rationalize the observed di §erences between the complaints against monitored and unmonitored agents.
Prediction 2: The Role of Expert Skill
In section 1.4, we describe our corollary 4 that more experienced agents are more likely to take advantage of customers.
Across the speciÖcations in Table 5 , an additional year of agent experience increases the odds of receiving a complaint by roughly 7%. Of course, agents with more experience have had more opportunities to receive a complaint. However, in this section, we present results suggesting that longevity alone cannot explain the estimated e §ect of experience.
In Table 6 , we present results of a Tobit speciÖcation with complaints per licensed year as the dependent variable to account for agent experience. 21 Across all columns, the coe¢cients on agent experience are similar and statistically signiÖcant. In terms of magnitude, an additional year of experience results in an additional 0.01 complaints per year. In Table 2 , we reported mean complaints per year of approximately 0.01óour Tobit results suggest that for an average agent, another year of experience may more than double the agentís complaint rate. Our estimates are a lower bound on the true coe¢cient for experience for three reasons. First, the longer an agent has been in business, the greater the proportion of ìbad applesî in his cohort that has been weeded out through disciplinary actions, leaving agents who are more ethical on average. 22 Since complaints against these ìbad applesî are no longer included in the data, we expect our estimates of the e §ect of experience to be biased towards zero. Second, since our complaint data span 15 years, we cannot observe early-career complaints against agents with more than 15 years of experience. Finally, client attrition may also attenuate estimates of the e §ect of agent experience. Consider our dependent variable
; where Y ears is years of experience. Assume for now that there is no client attrition and an agent acquires 10 clients per year. In ten years, a new agent has acquired 100 clients. Suppose that the chance of receiving a complaint is 1% per client per year. This means that an agent with 10 years of experience should (in expectation) receive one complaint. In an agentís 20th year, he has 200 clients and should expect two complaints. Thus, without attrition, complaints per year does not depend on experience. Now consider the role of client attrition. Over the past 10 years, an agent with 20 years of experience has acquired the same number of clients as an agent with only 10 years of experience. However, due to attrition, the number of clients that he retained from his Örst 10 years is now less than the number of clients from the more recent decade. Thus, assuming that the chance of a complaint is still 1% per client per year, we would expect the ratio of complaints per year of the agent with 20 years of experience to be less than the ratio of the agent with 10 years of experience. Thus, we underestimate the true e §ect of experience on complaints.
One might worry that the most ethical company agents become independent operators after building up experience in the industry. If true, this could drive the di §erence in complaint rates between monitored and unmonitored agents. However, on average, company agents have been licensed signiÖcantly longer than independent agents (p < 0:01). Instead, one might wonder if bad agents are being detected and Öred by the Örms using company agents. Although our data do not allow us to observe this directly, this sorting would work against our predicted e §ect. That is, we would expect to observe higher complaints rates for independent agents if this organizational form included former ìbadî company agents.
Although this is not an explicit component of our theory model, it is worth noting the sign and signiÖcance of our coe¢cient estimate for out-of-state agents. In Tables 5 and 6 , these agents appear to be less likely to face complaints of misconduct for both PC and LA. This aligns with the intuition that out-of-state agents, from whom it might be di¢cult to recover compensation in the event of a misdeed, must be more ethical in order to attract clients. Another simple explanation is that these out-of-state agents are being prosecuted by their domiciled stateís regulatory agency. Unfortunately, we observe only regulatory actions by the TDI. Finally, our empirical estimates provide little evidence that agents with professional designations are any less likely to have been the subject of complaints. Because these agents represent only 1% of the population of agents, we are unable to determine empirically whether these designations indicate skill or are simply attempted signals.
Prediction 3: Connoisseur Customers
The third prediction of the model, described by Proposition 2, is that an increase in the population of knowledgeable customers will weakly reduce agentsí misconduct. To test this prediction in our data, we include a variable that is an estimate of the percentage of the population within a 25-miles radius of the agent that is employed in the Önance industry. Here, we are assuming that employment in this industry is correlated with more knowledge about insurance products.
Using a distance algorithm, we calculated the distance between the geographic centroid of all Texas ZIP codes and matched ZIP codes to 2010 County Business Pattern data from the U.S. Census Bureau. After identifying all ZIP codes within 25-miles of an agentís business address, we aggregated the employment statistics. 23 We do not include potential client employment statistics for non-resident agents because they do not have a Texas business location; as a result, non-resident agents are excluded from the analysis in Tables 7 and 8 . The results in Table 7 suggest that the employment type of local populations has little, if any, ináuence on agent misconduct. The coe¢cients on employment in Önance are negative for LA and positive for PC, but are very small in magnitude. Tobit estimates of the e §ect of employment in Önance are similar in Table 8 , but also fail to achieve statistical signiÖcance. Note that the inclusion of the employment measure and the resulting exclusion of nonresident agents has little impact on the other coe¢cients of interest. 24 Recall that the theory predicts that only su¢ciently high levels of consumer education will reduce misconductóour empirical results suggest that the population of consumers in Texas may not have reached this threshold of Önancial consumer literacy. Note also that, holding Öxed the degree of malfeasance, if more educated people are more likely to report a complaint, then complaint rates should be greater for experts working in more Önance-oriented areas. This works against Önding evidence showing that complaint rates fall when customers are more knowledgeable.
Prediction 4: Monitoring and Marketshare
The Önal prediction of the theory model is that monitored agents will face higher buy rates than unmonitored agents. Since buy rate data are not available on an individual customeragent level, we infer buy rates from marketshares.
Let n m be the number of agents under organizational form m 2 fC; Ig; where C and I denote company and independent agents, respectively. Suppose that r 2 N is an agentís potential customer áow rate per year. (1  p) is the client attrition rate).
In the long run, we can express the number of clients for a given agent as
Now, assuming that an average client has an annual total premium payment of ; the total premiums per long-lived agent (i.e. as t ! 1) is
We make three simplifying assumptions about the nature of the market: 1) both organizational forms have the same customer áow rate, r; 2) both organizational forms have the same customer persistence rate, p; and 3) the size of premium paid by an average customer is the same across organizational forms. These assumptions are particularly strong for relatively young agents. To accommodate this challenge, we compare average agents with at least three years of experience. 25 In our data, conditional on having at least three years of experience, company agents have approximately 14 years of experience, while independent agents average 11 years. For exposition, we assume a persistence rate of 0.9. We compare the theoretical total premiums by organizational form To inform our empirical test, we return to Table 3 reporting aggregate premium levels for both PC and LA. Rearranging the expressions above, we Önd that
Total Company Expert Premiums Total Independent Expert Premiums
 0:91
Recall that if
; then customers buy from independent and company agents at the same rate. While our main theory model predicts that
we Önd a buy rate ratio that is slightly lower than 1. Of course, we make many assumptions in constructing this empirical comparison, and we cannot test whether our approximation is in fact di §erent from 1.
Our main model assumes that k is endogenousók is a function of expertís misconduct level s. However, if k is instead exogenous, (e.g. a Öxed cost regardless of s) and q is small, then it is straightforward to show that although company experts still commit greater misconduct than independent experts, they face the roughly similar buy rates b  and
Level of complaints
We can also consider the impact of organizational form, experience, and customer education on the level of complaints with an OLS regression that is conditional on an agent having received one or more complaints. These results are reported in Table 9 .
Estimates suggest that, conditional on receiving at least one complaint, independent agents are more likely to have been the subject of multiple complaintsóthat is, while fewer independent agents have complaints, they are more likely to be repeat o §enders. One plausible explanation is that there exists a distribution of propensity for agent malfeasance. Assume that the level of complaints increase with this propensity. Since independent agents are less likely to receive complaints, those who actually do must have a greater propensity for malfeasance on average. Hence, conditional on having any complaint Öled, we expect these independent agents to have more complaints.
While there is little evidence that the presence of a professional designation is associated with greater incidence of expert malfeasance, we do Önd that the level of complaints is negatively related to having a designation. As previously discussed, it is not clear precisely what these designations representófor example, they might reáect skill, signalling or other unobservable attributes. Since fewer than 1% of agents have any professional designation and 80% of agents with a complaint have received only one, we interpret this Önding very cautiously.
National Complaints Data
We also obtained a national-level dataset of sales practice complaints against Örms for 2008 to 2011, collected by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). Agentlevel data are not available nationally and, in general, states do not disclose individual agentand Örm-level sales practice complaints. 26 We aggregated the complaints by Örm and matched the NAIC data to Örm characteristics obtained from A.M. Best. Using the A.M. Best marketing type classiÖcation, we identiÖed Örms using either the company or independent agent models; we excluded Örms using Internet and direct sales. Firms that appeared in the A.M. Best data but not in the NAIC complaint data were coded as having faced zero complaints. In total, the Önal dataset includes 1930 PC and LA Örms. Note that all complaints in the NAIC data were deemed justiÖed by state regulators. Table 10 presents results from the national data. In the Örst column, the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the Örm has faced any complaints during the time period; in the second column, the dependent variable is the total number of complaints. Both regressions include a control for the net premiums written by the Örm as well as dummy variables for all states in which a given Örm markets insurance. These state-level controls capture both di §erences in the regulatory environment and di §erences in statesí reporting to the NAIC. 27 Using a logit regression with a rare-events correction, we Önd evidence that Örms using monitored company agents are more likely to face a justiÖed sales complaint, relative to a Örm using independent agents. The odds ratio suggests that PC Örms using monitoring are 58% more likely to have received a justiÖed complaint. For LA, the overall e §ect of monitoring is not statistically di §erent from zero (p = 0:15):
We Önd similar results examining the total number of complaints in Table 10 . Firms using monitored company agents face more justiÖed complaints. Again, we see that the e §ect is being primarily driven by PC Örms. For LA, the overall e §ect of monitoring is not statistically di §erent from zero (p = 0:74):
Overall, an analysis of these national data support our previous results, suggesting that, on average, monitored agents are more likely to take advantage of customers relative to independent agents.
Conclusion
In this paper, we explore how monitoring a §ects the level of misconduct in credence good markets with price-taking experts. Guided by theory, we Önd empirical evidence supporting the prediction that these markets operate di §erently than in standard asymmetric information problem settings.
In particular, rather than experts with strong reputations behaving more ethically, branded experts are actually less ethical in equilibrium. Similarly, experts who survive over time and become more skilled exhibit the greatest levels of misconduct. The intuition is as follows: in our setting, experts are price takers and thus extract surplus based on the value of their Örmís monitoring and their own skills through increased malfeasance. We Önd substantial empirical evidence that these predictions hold in the insurance industry.
Our work provides some preliminary suggestions for managing the credence good market problem. For low levels of monitoring, increases in monitoring may actually increase the level of misconduct; however, very intense monitoring will restore the market. Of course, intense monitoring is particularly challenging in credence good markets since detection is di¢cult. Our theoretical and empirical Öndings also suggest that regulators should focus their e §orts on more experienced expertsónot only do these experts have more customers, they are also more likely to take advantage of their clients. Of course, in practice, high levels of costly monitoring may not be feasible.
We also present theoretical results that show that increases in the population of expert consumersóthose who can better discern misconductóhave the two-fold positive e §ect of increasing expert revenues and, with su¢cient numbers, restoring the market. This suggests that informational campaigns to educate customers could prove promising. Our Öndings suggest that regulators should actually emphasize customer education over expert monitoring. Intuitively, while monitoring only provides a ìstickî in the event of bad advice, the presence of informed consumers disciplines dishonest expert behavior by limiting the gains from misconduct while rewarding honest advice with higher purchase rates. A natural or Öeld experiment, where consumers are randomly endowed with more information speciÖcally about a credence good, would be enlightening.
Appendix

Di §erent Payo §s and Reporting Rates for Customers
Overall, we Önd strong empirical evidence of our prediction that monitored company experts are more likely to take advantage of customers than unmonitored independent experts. However, one might be concerned that company agentsí access to resources in the event of allegations of misconduct (i.e. ìdeeper pocketsî) might induce more customer complaints, relative to independent agents.
Assume that, in expectation, a customer is harmed more by the misconduct of an independent expert, relative to a company expert. That is, the expected value of reporting an abuse conditional on conviction is greater for the customer of a company expert. If the cost of Öling is very low, then almost every discovered abuse should be reported and we would not see any di §erence in the ratio of justiÖed to total complaints across organizational forms. 28 However, if there exists some material cost of Öling a complaint, then customers of company experts will report suspected misconduct more often. If company and independent experts are equally ethical, then company experts will face more reported complaints.
To illustrate, let g i be the probability that agent i is guilty of misconduct and let g i be distributed uniformly between 0 and 1. Suppose that the expected payo §s to a customer after any conviction of a company or independent agent is $1,000 or $500, respectively. Let customersí reporting costs be $100. A customer will not report an expert unless her expected net payo § from doing so is (weakly) positive. Therefore, the company agentís customer reports all cases where g i  0:1 and the independent agentís customer reports all cases where g i  0:2:
DeÖne g  as the threshold at which the customer chooses to report suspected misconduct. Now, the expected conviction rate given a report of the suspected impropriety is
where f is the density of g. For our example above, conditional on being reported, g  = 0:2 leads to a conditional conviction rate of 60%, while g  = 0:1 yields a conditional conviction rate of 55%: Thus, the company expert will have an unconditional conviction rate of 90%  55% = 49:5% and the independent expert will be convicted 80%  60% = 48% of the time.
More generally, we can write
If reporting costs are low, g  will be small for both independent and company customers.
Hence, we would expect little distinguishable di §erences in reporting and conviction rates between expert types. By focusing on convictions (i.e., justiÖed complaints) rather than all complaints, any potential di §erence is further minimized. Empirically, there is also a countervailing force reducing reporting rates for company expertsí customers. Recall that part of the monitorís role is to resolve disputes before they reach the regulator. In contrast, customers of independent experts have little recourse before contacting the regulator. As a result, in the data, we might expect observed complaint rates for company experts to represent a lower bound. *)p)<)0.1,)**)p)<)0.05,)***)p)<)0.01 Table) 
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